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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Casey Wilson was convicted of one count of felony possession of
methamphetamine.

On appeal, Mr. Wilson contends that the evidence was insufficient to

establish that he possessed methamphetamine, because the State failed to prove he constructively
possessed the baggie containing methamphetamine residue found on the floor in another
individual's home, and there were two people in the room when law enforcement entered the
home.
Mr. Wilson further contends that the prosecutor attempted to shift its burden to prove
possession of the baggie containing methamphetamine residue by claiming that Mr. Wilson
failed to bring in a witness to testify as to who owned the baggie. This was misconduct, in
violation of Mr. Wilson's constitutional rights to a fair trial. In addition to shifting the burden to
Mr. Wilson to prove his innocence, the prosecutor also commented on Mr. Wilson's right to
remain silent and encouraged the jury to decide the case based on their passions and prejudices
by disparaging both Mr. Wilson's decision to go to a jury trial and his right to mount a defense to
the State's charges.

Although the misconduct was not objected to, it rises to the level of

fundamental error.

Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of

conviction and remand his case for new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At three o'clock in the morning of December 6, 2017, police officers executed a search
warrant on a house belonging to Jacqulyn Jensen, and ultimately recovered three empty baggies
containing trace amounts of methamphetamine residue. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.110, L.3 - p.111,
L.16; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.69, Ls.7-15.) At the outset of the search, the officers encountered
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Ms. Jensen, the homeowner. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.111, Ls.6-16; p.197, Ls.13-16.) At the officer's
request, Ms. Jensen opened a safe located on the upstairs floor, which contained a baggie with a
residual amount of methamphetamine. 1 (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.156, L.9 - p.157, L.8; p.200, L.8 p.201, L.3.)
The officers next attempted to enter an occupied basement bedroom during the search.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.112, L.10 - p.113, L.18.) After speaking with the occupants of the basement
bedroom from behind the closed door, the officers kicked open the door. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.112,
L.10 - p.113, L.18.) The basement room contained a mattress on the floor and two individuals,
identified as Tabatha New and Casey Wilson. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.114, L.5 - p.115, L.2.) There
were two driver's licenses/identifications by the bed-one for Mr. Wilson and one for Ms. New,
along with various bits of trash, including an empty plastic baggie. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.149, Ls.59; p.171, Ls.6-22; p.172, L.14 - p.173, L.24; State's Exhs. 14, 15.) Officers confiscated the
baggie because they believed the dust inside the baggie was methamphetamine residue. (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.148, L.17 - p.149, L.15; p.171, L.13 - p.172, L.16.) The basement bedroom also
contained a trunk and plastic tubs with clothing inside them. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.173, Ls.5-24.)
Upon a search of the trunk, officers located a flashlight, which housed a baggie containing what
officers believed to be methamphetamine residue and a scale. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.173, L.5 p.174, L.13; p.184, Ls.4-24; p.188, L.22-p.189, L.3; State's Exhs. 25-28.)
Mr. Wilson was arrested for possession of methamphetamine. (See R., pp.36-38.) The
laboratory technician who testified at trial did not test the methamphetamine inside the baggie
inside the flashlight. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.60, L.23 - p.61, L.1.) The substance in the baggie
found on the floor weighed under 0.1 grams, and was therefore not a weighable amount of
1

The State's laboratory technician testified that an amount smaller than 0.1 grams is designated
as residue and is not a weighable amount. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.57, Ls.4-7; p.59, Ls.5-11.)
2

methamphetamine. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.20, L.10 - p.21, L.2.) A search of Mr. Wilson's person
revealed "some change, disposable lighter, scratch lottery ticket, a piece of plastic from what
looked like a WinCo shopping bag, [and] Social Security cards." 2 (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.115, Ls.1520; State's Exhs. 35, 37.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Wilson was charged by Information with one count of
possession of methamphetamine, one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia,
and one count of misdemeanor frequenting a place where controlled substances are known to be
located. 3 (R., pp.36-38.)
Mr. Wilson exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. The State's trial witnesses
were law enforcement officers and a laboratory technician. (See Trial Tr. Vols. I, II, generally.)
During the trial, Mr. Wilson made an I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing
that proximity does not prove possession.

(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.61, L.21 - p.62, L.12.) The

district court denied the motion. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.62, L.22 - p.64, L.20.)
Mr. Wilson testified that he and his fiancee, Tabatha New, were asked by Ms. Jensen to
come stay the night.

(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.69, L.7 - p.71, L.2.) Although Mr. Wilson and

Ms. New had previously stayed in this bedroom, the items in the room had been moved about by
Ms. Jensen, including clothes "thrown, like around the bed and on the floor." (Trial Tr. Vol. II,
p.71, Ls.21-25; p.75, L.21 - p.76, L.3.) Mr. Wilson testified that he and Ms. New arrived at the
house late at night, and they just grabbed some blankets and went to sleep. (Trial Tr. Vol. II,
p.72, L.5 - p.73, L.1.) Mr. Wilson testified that he had never seen or possessed the plastic bag

2

One officer testified that he believed the piece of plastic baggie was an item of drug
paraphernalia-that individuals would twist a piece of baggie around controlled substanceshowever no controlled substances were found in the piece of plastic. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.7-17;
State's Exhs.37-39.)
3
The State moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charges prior to trial. (R., pp. I 03-04, 110-11.)
3

the officers found on the floor in the bedroom. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.73, Ls.2-13.) He further
testified that he had never seen the flashlight the officers found in a trunk in the bedroom and
that he had never been in the trunk where the flashlight was found. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.75, Ls.411.) The prosecutor extensively cross-examined Mr. Wilson on his failure to give any further
explanation to Detective DeBie or to come to the prosecutor's office prior to trial in order to
explain what had happened in the room prior to the police entry. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.79, L.18 p.80, L.17.)
In her rebuttal closing remarks, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Mr. Wilson failed to
disprove he had possession of the baggie as he did not call Ms. Jensen at trial. (Trial Tr. Vol. II,
p.108, Ls.16-19.) The prosecutor also attacked Mr. Wilson's decision to go to "the work, time,
and expense of a jury trial," the defense's fight with the State for half an hour about the
admission of the lab report, and their failed "cover up" that the baggie contained
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.110, L.11 -p.111, L.2.)
Mr. Wilson was found guilty of felony possession of a controlled substance.

(Trial

Tr. Vol. II, p.117, Ls.1-18; R., p.157.) The district court sentenced Mr. Wilson to a unified term
of four years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Wilson on
probation for three years.

(1/13/20 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-14; R., pp.203-13.) Mr. Wilson filed a

motion for a new trial, which was denied after a hearing. (R., pp.173-97.)
Mr. Wilson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.219-23, 238-44.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Was there sufficient evidence that Mr. Wilson possessed methamphetamine?

II.

Did the prosecutor impermissibly elicit testimony on Mr. Wilson's exercise of his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent?

III.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing arguments?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Mr. Wilson Possessed Methamphetamine

A.

Introduction
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Wilson possessed

methamphetamine where the baggie contained a residual amount of methamphetamine was
found on the floor in a bedroom in a house where Mr. Wilson did not reside, the owner of the
house had a quantity of the same controlled substance in a safe upstairs, and two other persons,
in addition to Mr. Wilson, had access to the room in which the baggie was found.

B.

Standard Of Review
In State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals outlined the

appellate standard ofreview for sufficiency of the evidence:
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding
of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its
burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998);
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991). We will
not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001;
State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App.1985). Moreover,
we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,
822 P .2d at 1001. Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence
presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009); State v. Stevens, 93
Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947--48 (1969). In fact, even when circumstantial
evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be
sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable
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inferences of guilt. Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432; State v. Slawson,
124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199,203 (Ct.App.1993).
158 Idaho at 177-78.

C.

The Evidence Was Insufficient To Prove Mr. Wilson Possessed Methamphetamine
To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must show the act of possession

and "the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance." State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926
(1993). "Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive. When the accused
is not in actual physical possession the State must show that he had such knowledge and control
of the substance as to establish constructive possession." State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706
(Ct. App. 1994). Moreover, "[w]here joint occupancy is involved," "substantial evidence must
exist establishing the guilt of each defendant, not merely the collective guilt of both." State v.
Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784 (Ct. App. 1987). "Proximity alone will not suffice as proof of

possession." Id. 112 Idaho at 784-85. "[C]onstructive possession exists where a nexus between
the accused and the controlled substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable
inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, had the power and the intent to
exercise dominion or control over the [item]." Id. 112 Idaho at 784.
The jury was instructed that, in order for Mr. Wilson to be guilty of possessing
methamphetamine, the State must prove that on or about the date alleged, in Idaho, Mr. Wilson:
[P]ossessed any amount of methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, and the
defendant either knew it was methamphetamine and/or amphetamine or believed
it was a controlled substance.
(R., p.149.)
Possession was defmed in Jury Instruction No. 18:
A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has
physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it. More than one

7

person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence and has
the power and intention to control it.
(R., p.150.)
In this case, the State failed to present any evidence that Mr. Wilson possessed the
baggie, or had knowledge the baggie contained methamphetamine residue, or that he had the
intention to control the baggie on the floor.
In State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals had to
determine, inter alia, whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict
on a charge of possession of psilocybin mushrooms with the intent to deliver. Id. at 885. The
case began when the police, armed with a warrant to search Burnside's car for evidence of
methamphetamine dealing, approached him and a passenger while they were eating m a
restaurant.

Id. at 883.

During the search of the car, the police discovered both

methamphetamine and psilocybin mushrooms. Id. Burnside was charged with, and convicted
of, possession of psilocybin mushrooms with intent to deliver and possession of
methamphetamine. Id. at 883.
The Court of Appeals noted that, in order to prove that Burnside possessed the psilocybin
mushrooms, the State had to establish that he was "aware the mushrooms were in his car and that
he exercised dominion or control over them." Id. at 885. It noted that "the jury could not infer
constructive possession from the mere fact that Burnside occupied, with a passenger, the
automobile in which the drugs were seized." Id. (citing State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752 (1976)).
The Court of Appeals explained that, "in order to prevail, the state had to offer evidence which
established that Burnside, individually, knew of the illegal drugs and that he exercised dominion
over them." Burnside, 115 Idaho at 885.

8

In concluding that the State had not met its burden, the Court of Appeals analyzed the
relevant facts:
The mushrooms were discovered in a black vinyl bag in Burnside's automobile.
When the police began their search of the car, Burnside told the officers that the
bag was not his. At trial, Burnside's passenger, Redd, repeatedly declared that he,
and not Burnside, owned the mushrooms. Evidence suggested that Burnside may
have sold the mushrooms to Redd, several hours earlier, in a motel room. The
mushrooms later were packaged for delivery. However, Redd claimed at trial,
that he, and not Burnside, had packaged the mushrooms. When asked if he had
packaged the mushrooms for Burnside, Redd stated that he could not remember.
The evidence does not establish that Burnside exercised dominion and control
over the mushrooms, when in the car. The state failed to rebut Redd's claim of
sole ownership ... Burnside's remark to the police, that the black bag was not his,
suggests he probably knew the drugs were in his car. The motel sale also
indicates Burnside's knowledge. However, neither piece of evidence establishes
control. We find an absence of evidence on this element of the offense.
Id. at 885-86.

Because the baggie containing methamphetamine residue was found in a common area
occupied by two or more people and not in Mr. Wilson's actual possession, Idaho law required
the State to establish constructive possession-specifically, that Mr. Wilson knew of the
methamphetamine residue in the baggie and had the power and intention to control the item.
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242 (1999).

The State failed to establish Mr. Wilson had

knowledge or control of the methamphetamine residue in the baggie on the bedroom floor where
the item was found in a house occupied by several individuals. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.167, L.1 p.169, L.3.) The evidence admitted at trial showed there were at least three people in the house
at the time of the service of the search warrant, Ms. New and Mr. Wilson, and Ms. Jensen, who
had a quantity of the same controlled substance in her safe. 4 (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.156, L.9 - p.157,
L.8; p.167, L.1 - p.169, L.3; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.76, Ls.10-12; p.77, Ls.18-20.) Further, the
4

Ms. Jensen was charged with, and pled guilty to, possession of methamphetamine.
Tr. Vol. I, p.158, Ls.5-8.)
9

(Trial

baggie containing the methamphetamine residue and the flashlight containing the baggie with
methamphetamine residue both appeared to be empty. 5 (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.171, Ls.9-14; State's
Exhs.14-19, 25-28.) Unlike the facts in State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 966 P.2d 53, 58-59
(Ct. App. 1998) (noting the fact that the drugs and paraphernalia were found in the defendant's
garage in plain view support a fmding the defendant knew of their existence), the photographs of
the baggie on the floor of the room admitted at trial appeared to show an empty plastic baggie.
(State's Exhs. 14-19.) The other baggie of methamphetamine and the scale were located inside
the flashlight and were not within the plain view of Mr. Wilson. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.173, Ls.5-24;
State's Exh. 24.) The State failed to establish that Mr. Wilson had knowledge of or intent to
exercise dominion and control over the substance. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178. The State failed
to establish that Mr. Wilson possessed the methamphetamine residue in the baggie on the
bedroom floor. Because this case involved a situation of joint occupancy, "substantial evidence
must exist establishing the guilt of each defendant, not merely the collective guilt of both." See

Garza, 112 Idaho at 784. "Proximity alone will not suffice as proof of possession." Id. 112
Idaho at 784-85.

Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Wilson

possessed methamphetamine.
Due to the insufficiency of the evidence, the jury verdict is invalid. The insufficient
evidence of possession requires that the judgment of conviction be vacated.

5

The prosecutor argued in her closing remarks that the baggie of methamphetamine residue in
the flashlight proved Mr. Wilson's knowledge of the baggie on the floor. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.94,
L.20 - p.95, L. 1.)

II.
The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Wilson's Rights To Remain Silent And To A Fair Trial By Eliciting
Testimony On His Silence And Using His Silence To Imply Guilt

A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilson asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated when the prosecutor commented on and impermissibly elicited testimony on
Mr. Wilson's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Mr. Wilson asserts that the
prosecutor's questions violated his right to remain silent and denied him a fair trial. Although
the violation was unobjected-to, Mr. Wilson can demonstrate fundamental error. Mr. Wilson
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a
new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Alleged constitutional errors not followed by a contemporaneous objection are reviewed

under the fundamental error standard. State v. Bernal, 164 Idaho 190, 193 (2018) (citing State v.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010)). Fundamental error review includes a three-pronged inquiry
wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error:
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly; and (3)
the appellate record must reflect that the unpreserved error affected the outcome. State v. Miller,
165 Idaho 115, 119-20 (2019).
In Miller, the Idaho Supreme Court "reemphasize[ d] that in order to satisfy [the second

Perry prong] a defendant bears the burden of showing clear error in the record," meaning the
record "must contain evidence of the error and the record must also contain evidence as to

11

whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object." Id. 165 Idaho at 119 .
Where the record contains no "evidence regarding whether counsel's decision was strategic, the
claim is factual in nature and thus more appropriately addressed via a petition for post-conviction
relief" Id. Further, whereas a defendant previously satisfied Perry's third prong by "proving
there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial," Miller held that
the appellate record must establish that the unpreserved error "actually affected the outcome of
the trial proceedings." Id. 165 Idaho at 120. (emphasis added).

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error By Eliciting
Testimony On His Silence And By Using Evidence Of Mr. Wilson's Silence To Imply
Guilt
During Mr. Wilson's jury trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony on Mr. Wilson's silence

and commented on Mr. Wilson's right to remain silent. After Mr. Wilson testified on crossexamination that he threw a blanket on the bed in the dark, the prosecutor asked him what he told
the detective who interviewed him post-Miranda, while handcuffed:

Q. Okay. That's all right. But you did not tell Detective DeBie this, did you?
A. I did tell him I was going to answer the door when they kicked it.

Q. Okay. You told him that, but you didn't tell him about the blanket thing and
coming from the - you know, you didn't give any kind of provenance for that bag
ofmeth, did you? You just said, "I don't know. It's not mine." Okay. And now,
you've had one year and nine months since the date of this incident, correct?
A. Yes.

Q. And you've never told Detective DeBie what you just told the jury.
A. No, because I spoke with him that one time.

Q. Okay. And did you tell me what you just told to the jury?

12

A. I haven't had conversations with you.
Q. No. Okay. But nobody's ever bothered to come to the State and say, "Hey,
we might have something here," have they?
A. No, I didn't think ...
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.79, L.18 -p.80, L.17.)
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
states in relevant part, ''No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himselfl.]" U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees that

"[ n Jo person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himselfl. ]" IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 13. See also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011). "The U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted this right also to bar the prosecution from commenting on a defendant's
invocation of that right." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
613-14 (1965)).
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the United States Supreme Court asserted that
although true that, "the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no
penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warning." 426 U.S. at 618.

Doyle further stated that the use of post-Miranda silence:
does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to
call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did
not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an
unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony.
426 U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182-183 (1975) (White, J.
concurring)).
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To clarify "when and how" the prosecutor can use silence at trial, the Court has divided
silence into pre- and post-arrest and pre- and post-Miranda6 categories. In instances of postarrest, post-Miranda silence, "a prosecutor may not use evidence of . . . silence for either
impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), or as substantive evidence of guilt in the
State's case-in-chief, Wainwrightv. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284,292 (1986)." Ellington, 151 Idaho
at 60. In instances of post-arrest, but pre-Miranda, silence, a prosecutor may not use "silence to
infer guilt in its case-in-chief" Id. (citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820-21 (1998)); see

also State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, 234 (2014) ("It is clearly erroneous for a prosecutor to
introduce evidence of the defendant's postarrest silence for the purpose of raising an inference of
guilt." (quoting State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 591 (1983)).

Similarly, "[i]n cases of pre-

Miranda, pre-arrest silence, the prosecutor may not use that evidence 'solely for the purpose of
implying guilt."' State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 147 (2014) (quoting State v. Parton, 154 Idaho
558, 566 (2013)). A prosecutor may, however, use silence to impeach the defendant in postarrest, but pre-Miranda, situations. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60. In addition, a prosecutor may use
silence for impeachment purposes if the silence is pre-arrest, pre-Miranda. Id.
The Court has also broadly defined the conduct that constitutes an improper comment on
silence.

For example, "[i]t is well-established that a prosecutor commits misconduct by

deliberately eliciting or attempting to elicit inadmissible testimony." State v. Johnson, 163 Idaho
412, 423 (2018).

An attempt to elicit testimony on silence includes engaging in "a line of

questioning" that ''would create a high risk of an improper comment" on silence. Ellington, 151

6

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.")
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Idaho at 61. Yet not even deliberate or risky questioning is required to show misconduct. If a
prosecutor elicits unsolicited testimony that comments on a defendant's silence, that testimony is
"imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct."

Id.

A

witness's "gratuitous comment" is still misconduct. Johnson, 163 Idaho at 423.
"Thus, when a defendant remains silent after receiving [the Miranda] warnings, that
silence may indicate nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of the Miranda rights. Doyle, 426
U.S. at 617. The Doyle Court concluded that upon a defendant's receipt of the Miranda
warnings, "that person is implicitly guaranteed that his or her silence will not carry a penalty."

Id. 426 U.S. at 618.

"Under those circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a

deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach his or her
exculpatory story subsequently offered at trial." Id.
In this case, Mr. Wilson was Mirandized during the search of the house. (R., p.19.) He
was handcuffed and interviewed by Detective DeBie in a bedroom, while another officer
watched them. 7 (See State's Exh. 3.) Mr. Wilson went to jail. (R., pp.14, 21.) Mr. Wilson was
appointed defense counsel on December 7, 2017. (R., pp.3, 25.) Mr. Wilson was notified of his
rights, including his right to remain silent, on January 2, 2018. (R., p. 39.) Mr. Wilson waived
his speedy trial right on April 23, 2018. (R., p.5.) By asking Mr. Wilson why he did not try to
contact her prior to the September 18-19, 2019 trial to tell her his version of the events, the
prosecutor's comments even applied to the time period after Mr. Wilson had been before a
magistrate judge and had been appointed counsel.

7

The interview was recorded, however, a Go-Pro was used in lieu of a body camera, thus the
audio is of such poor quality it is impossible to hear Mr. Wilson's responses to the officer's
questioning. (See State's Exh. 3.)
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The prosecutor sought to establish guilt by Mr. Wilson's exercise of a constitutional
right, a right he had been advised of by officers and subsequently by a magistrate and district
judge. See State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 714 (1999) (holding the prosecution went too far in
using the defendant's post-Miranda silence, "The prosecutor sought to establish guilt by
Strouse' s exercise of a constitutional right, a right he had been advised of by counsel and
subsequently by a magistrate and district judge.") The prosecutor committed misconduct when
she elicited testimony to the effect that Mr. Wilson's failure to contact the officers or the
prosecutor to tell them his side of the story was indicative of his guilt. These are improper
comments on the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Therefore, Mr. Wilson has satisfied
the first prong of the Miller standard to show a constitutional violation.
Next, the prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is simply no
strategic or tactical advantage to be gained by allowing the prosecutor to impugn Mr. Wilson's
silence, both during his interrogation and during the time period preceding trial. No reasonable
jurist would want this evidence before the jury because this evidence allows the jury to infer guilt
from the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights.
Defense counsel's position throughout trial was that the evidence was insufficient to
prove Mr. Wilson's knowledge of the baggie or the residue inside. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.106, L.1 p.107, L.3; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.61, L.21 -p.62, L.12; p.100, L.22- p.107, L.7.) If Mr. Wilson's
counsel had recognized that the prosecutor improperly used his silence to imply guilt during her
cross-examination of Mr. Wilson, defense counsel would have objected to this misconduct
because exclusion of that argument would have helped Mr. Wilson's case. Defense counsel
would have had a stronger case for acquittal without Mr. Wilson's silence being used against
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him. This demonstrates that the failure to object was not strategic or tactical. Therefore, under

Miller, Mr. Wilson has met his burden to show the error plainly exists.
Finally, the prosecutor's use of Mr. Wilson's silence to prove his knowledge and
possession actually affected the jury's verdict.

According to the prosecutor, Mr. Wilson's

silence informed the jury that Mr. Wilson did not explain the throwing the blanket on the bed in
the dark situation to Detective DeBie or the prosecutor because he knew he was guilty. Yet, the
State's evidence against Mr. Wilson was tenuous. The only evidence the State had to prove
Mr. Wilson's knowledge of the baggie and the residue inside was his proximity to the same.
Mr. Wilson has shown the prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the outcome of the trial.

See Miller, 165 Idaho at 120. He respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

III.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Shifting The Burden Of Proof,
By Using Evidence Of Mr. Wilson's Silence To Imply Guilt, And By Misstating And
Disparaging The Defense's Theory

A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilson asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, attempted to shift the burden of proof to
Mr. Wilson, commented on Mr. Wilson's silence, disparaged Mr. Wilson's decision to have a
jury trial, and maligned his defense of the case.

Mr. Wilson asserts that the prosecutor's

improper closing arguments denied him a fair trial. Although these violations were unobjectedto, Mr. Wilson can demonstrate fundamental error.
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In light of these errors, Mr. Wilson

respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a
new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the

misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141 (2014). Alleged constitutional errors not followed by a contemporaneous objection are
reviewed under the fundamental error standard, which was set forth in Section II(B) and is
incorporated herein by reference.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error By Shifting
The State's Burden Of Proof, By Using Evidence Of Mr. Wilson's Silence To Imply
Guilt, By Attacking Mr. Wilson's Decision To Go To Trial, And By Disparaging The
Defense
During Mr. Wilson's jury trial, the prosecutor, in closing arguments, attempted to shift

the burden of proof to Mr.

Wilson, commented on Mr. Wilson's silence, disparaged

Mr. Wilson's decision to have a jury trial, and maligned his defense of the case.

This

misconduct, though not objected-to, rises to the level of fundamental error. Each prong of the
fundamental error standard will be addressed in tum.

1.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor to Shift the State's Burden Of Proof

During her rebuttal closing statements, the prosecutor shifted the burden to Mr. Wilson to
prove who the methamphetamine baggie belonged to:
They could have brought Jacqulyn Jensen here today. If this was hers, where is
she? She's not here. If this was hers, why didn't the defense call her?
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(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.108, Ls.16-19.) However, the prosecutor's attempt to place its burden to
prove Mr. Wilson committed the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt back onto
Mr. Wilson, constitutes misconduct.
When a prosecutor misstates to the jury the State's burden of proof, this misconduct takes
away from a defendant a right essential to his or her defense. See State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho
679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Misconduct may occur by the prosecutor diminishing or distorting
the State's burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."). A defendant has
a Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to have a jury pass on the question of whether an offense has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) ("[T]he
Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment
requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated.").
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to
believe that Mr. Wilson's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to object to the
prosecutor's misconduct. The elements the State must prove in order for the jury to convict a
defendant of possession of a controlled substance are well-established. See State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 240 (1999). There is simply no strategic or tactical advantage that can possibly be
gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to correct, the prosecutor's shifting of its
burden to prove the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has recently considered what could be a "reasonable tactical decision" by defense
counsel and concluded:

Further, it is unlikely that the [defense's] failure to object was tactical or
strategic, as it appears unlikely that having the prosecutor imply that your client
holds the burden of proof would ever be a reasonable tactical decision.
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Stanfield v. State, 165 Idaho 889, 899 (2019) (holding prosecutor's statement, "[ i]n order for her

to be not guilty of this crime" implies that the defendant he somehow lost the presumption of
innocence which was not likely to ever be a reasonable tactical decision by defense counsel).
Here, the prosecutor told the jury that Mr. Wilson did not prove to whom the baggie with
methamphetamine residue belonged.

(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.108, Ls.16-19.)

The record

demonstrates that Mr. Wilson's counsel did not make a tactical decision not to object to the
prosecutor's implication that Mr. Wilson held the burden of proof
Finally, the prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the trial's outcome. The State's
evidence against Mr. Wilson was tenuous (see Section I). The quantity of methamphetamine in
the baggie was residual-there was no weight to the substance inside the baggie. (Trial Tr. Vol.
II, p.57, Ls.5-19; p.59, Ls.5-11.) The baggie appeared empty-there was not a solid substance
visible from even a few feet distance. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.171, Ls.6-14; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.57,
Ls.5-19; State's Exhs.14-19, 25-28.)

Thus, the prosecutor's attempt to shift its burden to

Mr. Wilson to prove someone else possessed the controlled substance residue actually affected
the jury's verdict.

2.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Comment On Mr. Wilson's Right To
Remain Silent

The prosecutor next commented on Mr. Wilson's silence and used his silence to prove his
guilt, telling the jury:
Now, this trial is not the only place that the defendant had to tell his story. But
now, instead, he hires an attorney, pays the attorney, goes through the work, time,
and expense of a jury trial instead. Ladies and gentlemen, that makes no sense.
He then gets up and tells the blanket story.
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He had all the time in the world to explain that to the police officers, all the time
in the world before the work and expense of this trial to tell someone, and he
didn't. Instead, he came in here.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.110, L.11 - p.111, L.2.)
The prosecutor committed misconduct when she implied that Mr. Wilson's failure to
contact the officers to tell them his side of the story was indicative of his guilt. These are
improper comments on the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 8 Further, by indicating in
her closing remarks that Mr. Wilson had "one year and nine months" to contact police to tell
them his version of the events (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.111, Ls.10-12), the prosecutor's comments
even applied to the time period after Mr. Wilson had been appointed counsel.

Therefore,

Mr. Wilson has satisfied the first prong of the Miller standard to show a constitutional violation.
Next, the prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is simply no
strategic or tactical advantage to be gained by allowing the prosecutor to impugn Mr. Wilson's
silence, both during his interrogation and during the time period preceding trial. No reasonable
jurist would want this evidence before the jury because this evidence allows the jury to infer guilt
from the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights. Reasonable defense counsel would not
want the jury to make such an inference, where Mr. Wilson's defense throughout trial was that
the State failed to prove Mr. Wilson had knowledge of and control over the baggie of residue.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.106, L.1 -p.107, L.3; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.61, L.21 -p.62, L.12; p.100, L.22p.107, L.7.) The failure to object was not strategic or tactical because defense counsel would
have had a stronger case without Mr. Wilson's silence being used against him. Therefore, under

Miller, Mr. Wilson has met his burden to show the error plainly exists.

8

Mr. Wilson's recitation of the legal authority informing his constitutional right to silence was
fully discussed in Section II(C), which Mr. Wilson incorporates herein.
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Finally, the prosecutor used Mr. Wilson's silence to inform the jury that Mr. Wilson did
not explain the full circumstances of the situation to Officer DeBie because he knew he was
guilty.

Yet, the State's evidence against Mr. Wilson was weak-it was based solely on his

proximity to the baggie at the time the officers entered the bedroom. Mr. Wilson has shown the
replete prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the outcome of the trial. See Miller, 165 Idaho
at 120. Further, this was not one improper remark, but a series of improper remarks strung
together in a rebuttal, as more fully discussed in Section C(3). He respectfully requests that this
Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

3.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Attack Mr. Wilson's Decision To Go
To Trial

The prosecutor next commented on Mr. Wilson's choice to exercise his constitutional
right to a jury trial and attacked the defense, telling the jury that Mr. Wilson could have told his
story without going to trial, "instead, he hires an attorney, pays the attorney, goes through the
work, time, and expense of a jury trial instead. Ladies and gentlemen, that makes no sense."
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.110, Ls.11-15.) She told the jury, "He had all the time in the world to
explain [his version of events] to the police officers, all the time in the world before the work and
expense of this trial to tell someone, and he didn't. Instead, he came in here." (Trial Tr. Vol. II,
p.110, L.24 -p.111, L.2.)
As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, "As public officers, prosecutors have a duty to ensure
that defendants receive fair trials." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715 (2009). Thus "a
prosecutor must 'guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to
hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.' A prosecutor must also ensure that
the jury receives only competent evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _ , 71 P.
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608, 611 (1903)). "Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court,
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to
their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than
they will give to counsel for the accused." Irwin, 71 P. at 611. The prosecutor's duty is to see
that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and should avoid
presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The prosecutor must refrain from
deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "the prosecutor's opinion carries with
it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's
judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16-19
(1985); accord State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979); State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho
124, 131 (Ct. App. 1986). "[A] prosecuting attorney may express an opinion in argument as to
the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such opinion is based upon the
evidence," but he should "exercise caution to avoid interjecting his personal belief and should
explicitly state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial."
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 n.1 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,
753 n.1 (1991)).
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is simply no
strategic or tactical advantage to be gained by allowing the prosecutor to attack Mr. Wilson's
decision to go to trial.

The prosecutor was attempting to inflame the jury by implying that

Mr. Wilson was wasting the jurors', the prosecutor's, the district court's time by insisting on
taking the case to trial. However, Mr. Wilson has a constitutional right to a jury trial, protected
by the U.S. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution.
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The prosecutor was not arguing that

defense counsel's theory was not supported by the evidence, instead, the prosecutor was arguing
that the defendant was wasting everyone's time by choosing to go to trial. 9 (Trial Tr. Vol. II,
p.110, L.11 - p.111, L.2.) Thus, the prosecutor's obloquy was an improper disparagement of
Mr. Wilson's choice to take the case to a jury trial and the defense's case. (Trial Tr. Vol. II,
p.111, Ls.3-12.)
The prosecutor's attack on Mr. Wilson's choice actually affected the jury's verdict by
stirring the passions of the jury. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.110, L.11 - p.111, L.12.) In this case, the
prosecutor committed the misconduct exclusively during her rebuttal closing remarksincreasing the impact of her prosecutorial misconduct where her improper comments were the
last words the jury heard before it began deliberations. In State v. Saenz, the Idaho Court of
Appeals emphasized that the timing of an inappropriate remark requires consideration.

167

Idaho 443, 470 P.3d 1252 (Ct. App. 2020). Although noting it was not determinative in every
case, the Idaho Court of Appeals "has acknowledged the potential increased impact prosecutorial
misconduct in a rebuttal closing argument may have." Saenz, 470 P.3d at 1260 (citing State v.
Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909-10 (Ct. App. 2010)). Further, this was not one improper remark,
but a series of improper remarks strung together in a brief rebuttal, as explained throughout
Section III(C). He respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand his case for a new trial.

4.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Disparage The Defense

The prosecutor also took umbrage with the defense's "fight" with the State over the lab
report. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.111, Ls.3-12.) The prosecutor said:
9

The defendant waited nearly two years for his jury trial; however, the prosecutor was wrong to
imply that Mr. Wilson was responsible for the delay where the prosecution moved the district
court to vacate the trial date on at least two occasions. (See R., pp.80-84, 91-95.)
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If it's not yours, then it doesn't matter if it's meth. But no. No. They fought the
State for half an hour.

So the lab report came in. And then they had to take more drastic measures.
They couldn't cover up that it wasn't meth anymore. They couldn't keep that out.
So now the story that's been waiting for one year and nine months comes in.
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.111, Ls.6-12.)
The right to present a defense is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).

"This right is a fundamental

element of due process of law." Id. The right to present a defense includes the right to offer
testimony of witnesses, compel their attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the
facts "to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Id. Closing argument should not include
disparaging comments about opposing counsel's argument. State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279,
290 (Ct. App. 2007). An attempt by the prosecutor to distort and disparage the defense is plainly
improper. State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 (Ct. App. 2007); Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-10
(finding misconduct where the prosecutor gravely distorted and mischaracterized the defense's
theory).
In State v. Page, the prosecutor made disparaging comments and engaged in personal
attacks on defense counsel during closing arguments to the jury. 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000).
The prosecutor in Page told the jury that the defense attorney was playing "lawyer games, word
games," meaning that he was misusing words or putting them in people's mouths. Id. The Page
Court held, "It is misconduct for a prosecutor to disparage a defense attorney in closing
argument." Id.
The prosecutor's comments misrepresenting and disparaging the defense's theory of the
case violated Mr. Wilson's right to a fair trial and his right to present a defense. The prosecutor
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did not argue that defense counsel's theory was not supported by the evidence; instead, the
prosecutor argued that Ms. Wilson was wasting the court's and the jury's time by objecting to
certain evidence admitted at trial. The prosecutor said, "And then they had to take more drastic
measures. They couldn't cover up that it wasn't meth anymore." (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.111, Ls.612.) However, the argument disparaged the defense, asked the jury to speculate that the defense
was engaged in a "cover up," and misstated the defense's theory of the case-the defense did not
challenge the residue in the baggie. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.103, L.15.) The prosecutor claimed that
defense counsel was trying to cover up the results of the laboratory testing on the
methamphetamine, when defense counsel was merely holding the State to its burden to prove the
elements of the offense. There was no evidence supporting the prosecutor's obloquy-it was an
unjustified claim by the prosecutor in his attempt to discredit the defense's case. Such appeals to
passions and prejudices encourages the jurors to render a decision based on matters outside the
evidence admitted at trial. See State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994). When a prosecutor
seeks "to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instruction and
the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150
Idaho at 22 7.
Under Miller, Mr. Wilson has met his burden to show the error plainly exists. These
errors are clear from the record where no reasonable defense attorney would want his client's
defense disparaged. Mr. Wilson repeatedly testified that the baggie on the floor was not his and
he did not know it contained a residual amount of methamphetamine. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.73,
Ls.2-13; p.76, Ls.3-19; p.78, L.25 - p.79, L.3; p.81, Ls.23-25.) Defense counsel set forth the
defense's theory in his closing remarks to the jury. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.106, Ls.6-11.) He said,
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"My client has consistently from day one said it's not his and entered a not-guilty plea and
waited to today to get his chance to be able to tell somebody that matters, because he did tell a
story to the police, 'I don't know about it. It's here. We got here early in the morning. That's it.
I didn't hear you guys come in."' (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.106, Ls.6-11.) Given that Mr. Wilson
exercised his right to a jury trial, there was no strategic or tactical reason to allow the prosecutor
to denigrate the defense of his case.
Finally, Mr. Wilson has shown that the prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the
trial's outcome where the State's evidence against Mr. Wilson was simply an empty baggie-one
containing barely visible dust or powder. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.171, Ls.6-14; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.57,
Ls.5-19; State's Exhs.14-19.) Therefore, the jury was required to determine whether Mr. Wilson
knew there was a baggie on the floor of his friend's bedroom that contained a slight amount of
methamphetamine residue. The prosecutor's attempts to stir the passions and prejudices of the
jury both by impugning Mr. Wilson's decision to go to trial, and by telling the jury that the
defense was "cover[ing] up" the fact that it was methamphetamine in the baggie (Trial Tr. Vol.
II, p.110, L.11- p.111, L.12) actually affected the outcome of the trial.
In light of the weak evidence of possession in this case (see Section I), and the multiple,
persistent variations of prosecutorial misconduct occurring during the prosecutor's rebuttal
closing remarks, Mr. Wilson has shown the prosecutorial misconduct actually affected the
outcome of the trial. See Miller, 165 Idaho at 120. He respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2021.
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